Articles scientifiques

Competitors' Resource-Oriented Strategies: Acting on Competitors' Resources through Interventions in Factor Markets and Political Markets


Academy of Management Review

janvier 2008, vol. 33, n°1, pp.97-121

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Competition, Business Intelligence, Competitive advantage, Marketing strategy, Resource-based theory of the firm, Resource management

We argue that we can reach a better understanding of the relationships between firm resources and competitive advantage by considering actions that firms take against their rivals' resources in factor markets and political markets. We outline market and firm characteristics that facilitate the deployment of competitors' resource-oriented strategies. We then argue that the effectiveness of the firm's actions on its competitors' resources depends on the competitive responses of the rivals being attacked.

Do Politics Shape Buyout Performance?


Harvard Business Review

novembre 2008, vol. 86, n°11, pp.26-27

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

This paper explores the relationship between dominant local political views and the volume and performance of leveraged buyout investments. We analyze a sample of 10,746 buyout investments in 4,633 distinct target companies made by 2,396 different funds managed by 1,300 different PE Firms from 1980 to 2003 and find strong support for the hypothesis that 'Republican' political views are positively related to both the volume of buyout activity and different measures of performance for these buyouts. Furthermore we find that situations in which the dominant political view recently shifted from 'Republican' to 'Democratic' lead to particularly low levels of activity and performance. Similarly, in cases in which the dominant political shifted from 'Democratic' to 'Republican' shortly after the focal point in time, we observe a particularly high level of activity and performance.

Do science and money go together ? The case of French Biotech industry

R. DURAND, O. Bruyaka, V. Mangematin

Strategic Management Journal

décembre 2008, vol. 29, n°12, pp.1281-1299

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : rent generation ' rent appropriation ' value drivers ' biotech industry Developing technological applications, entering exploitation alliances, and choosing between research- or service-focused strategic orientations are decisions that high-tech firms must manage concurrently.

This article explores systematically the contrasting effects of these strategic determinants on rent generation and rent appropriation using the entire population of French biotech firms (1994-2002). Findings indicate that science and money do not unconditionally go together-the direct relationship between rent-accruing resources (e.g., patents or articles) and rent appropriation varies depending on the type of resources and the strategic orientation. Moreover, the effects of strategic determinants differ for rent generation vs. rent appropriation: 1) technological application diversity undermines a firm's capacity to appropriate rents-in particular for research-oriented firms; 2) exploitation alliances favor rent generation but hinder rent appropriation; 3) service-oriented firms exhibit significantly better performance than research-oriented firms. Such evidence challenges the emergence in the biotechnology industry of a one-best strategic trajectory, as represented by research-intensive start-ups funded by private money engaged in publishing and patenting races

La vérité sur les performances dans le capital-investissement

O. GOTTSCHALG, L. Phalippou

Revue d'Economie Financière

21 novembre 2008, n°93, pp.201-211

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Depuis quelques années, la croyance en une surperformance du capital-investissement est alimentée par les articles élogieux sur les rendements de cette classe d'actifs qui paraissent régulièrement dans la presse économique et financière. Les statistiques de mesure des performances publiées par Thomson Venture Economics, qui servent de standard dans la profession, suggèrent que, sur longue période, les performances du capital-investissement se comparent favorablement à celles des indices boursiers. En dépit de ce consensus apparent, le point de vue d'une surperformance du capital-investissement vis-à-vis d'un placement dans le coté est erroné. En utilisant les données les plus complètes sur le capital-investissement en Amérique du Nord et en Europe, nous montrons que les performances du capital-investissement ont été, en moyenne, inférieures de près de 3 % par an à celles des grands indices de marchéFor some years now, the belief that private equity consistently outperforms other asset classes has been supported by articles appearing regularly in the economic and financial press praising the returns on private equity funds. Performance statistics published by industry standard Thomson Venture Economics suggest that, over the long term, private equity returns compare quite well to those of market indices. Despite this clear consensus, the point of view that private equity outperforms investments in listed assets is incorrect. Using the most comprehensive data on private equity in North America and Europe, we are able to demonstrate that private equity returns have been on average nearly 3% lower per year than those of the major market indices*RATE of return*FINANCIAL performance*INVESTMENT analysisPRIVATE equity

Measuring Idiosyncratic Risks in Leveraged Buyout Transactions

A. Groh, R. Baule, O. GOTTSCHALG

Quarterly Journal of Finance and Accounting

automne 2008, vol. 47, n°4, pp.5-24

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

We use a contingent claims analysis model to calculate the idiosyncratic risks in Leveraged Buyout transactions. A decisive feature of the model is the consideration of amortization. From the model, asset value volatility and equity value volatility can be derived via a numerical procedure. For a sample of 40 Leveraged Buyout transactions we determine the necessary model parameters and calculate the implied idiosyncratic risks. We verify the expected model sensitivities by varying the input parameters. For the first time, we are able to calculate Sharpe Ratios for individual Leveraged Buyouts, thereby fully incorporating the leverage risks


Département Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Campus HEC Paris
1, rue de la Libération
78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex


Bertrand QUELIN

Stratégie et Politique d'Entreprise (GREGHEC)

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