Articles scientifiques

How Do Firm Political Connections Impact Foreign Acquisitions? The Effects of Decision Makers’ Political and Firm Embeddedness

P. DUSSAUGE, R. ANAND, J ALBINO PIMENTEL

Global Strategy Journal

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Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)


Organization Design, Proximity, and Productivity Responses to Upward Social Comparison

T. OBLOJ, T. ZENGER

Organization Science

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Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : Incentives, Social Comparison Costs, Envy, Productivity, Organization Design

https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnxwdWJsaXNoZWRwYXBlcnMxMjM0fGd4OjVmOGU0MTIwNWZkNzQ2Zjc


We investigate the mechanisms that shape social comparison in organizations and generate socialcomparison costs. In particular, we focus on heterogeneity in the strength and type of incentivesand argue that, from an efficient design perspective, such variance in rewards is a double edgedsword. While the sorting and incentive effects that result may increase productivity, the socialcomparison processes that arise may dampen it. We posit that the mechanisms underlying thesebehavioral costs are shaped not only by the magnitude of reward variance, but by the formal andinformal design elements shaping the distance of advantaged peers. In other words, the moreproximate socially, structurally or geographically are those to whom one socially compares, thelarger the behavioral response. Empirically, we use an unanticipated event during which outlets ofa bank, previously operating under essentially homogenous incentives, were assigned totournament groups with differing ex ante probabilities of winning a prize—an event that increasesvariance in awards and hence generates an impetus for social comparison. We find that units withmore socially, geographically, and structurally proximate peers assigned to ‘advantaged’tournament groups decreased their productivity. We discuss implications of these results fororganizational design and boundaries

The Price of Admission: Organizational Deference as Strategic Behavior

J. JOURDAN, R. DURAND, P. THORNTON

American Journal of Sociology

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Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : deference, symbolic boundaries, strategic management, organizations

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2845785


Why would market organizations engage in symbolic and material acts conveying appreciation and respect to other organizations that confirm their inferior position in an established hierarchy? Deference, we argue, is the price outsider organizations pay to pass categorical and symbolic boundaries, and gain acceptance in contexts where insiders regard them as impure. Because not all organizations can or are willing to pay the price, deference varies according to positional, dispositional, and interactional characteristics. We examine and find support for the view of organizational deference as strategic behavior using empirical evidence on market finance organizations investing in film production in France over two decades. Our analysis expands research on non-conflictual interactions and symbolic boundaries in market setting

Too any Cooks Spoil the Broth? Geographic Concentration, Social Norms, and Knowledge Transfer

G. DI STEFANO, A. A. KING, G VERONA

Advances in Strategic Management

A paraître, vol. 36

Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2767610


A long tradition in social science research emphasizes the potential for knowledge to flow among firms co-located in dense areas. Scholars have suggested numerous modes for these flows, including the voluntary transfer of private knowledge from one firm to another. Why would the holder of valuable private knowledge willingly transfer it to a potential and closely proximate competitor? In this paper, we argue that geographic concentration has an effect on the expected compliance with norms governing the use of transferred knowledge. The increased expected compliance favors trust and initiates a process of reciprocal exchange. To test our theory, we use a scenario-based field experiment in gourmet cuisine, an industry in which property rights do not effectively protect knowledge and geographic concentration is common. Our results confirm our conjecture by showing that the expectation that a potential co-located firm will abide by norms mediates the relationship between geographic concentration and the willingness to transfer private knowledge

Willing and Able: A General Model of Organizational Responses to Normative Pressures

R. DURAND, O. HAWN, I. IOANNOU

Academy of Management Review

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Départements : Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise, GREGHEC (CNRS)

Mots clés : institutional theory, normative pressures, symbolic, substantive, conformity, compliance, issue salience

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3050072


We develop a conceptual understanding of when and how organizations respond to normative pressures. More precisely, we examine two main factors underlying the willingness and ability of organizations to respond to an issue: (1) issue salience, and (2) the cost-benefit analysis of resource mobilization. We suggest that decision-makers’ interpretation of issue salience in conjunction with their perception of the costs and benefits of taking action to address the issue generates five potential responses: symbolic compliance and symbolic conformity, substantive compliance and substantive conformity, and inaction. We extend the baseline model by examining a number of boundary conditions. By focusing on the willingness and ability of organizations to respond to normative pressures, and by adopting the issue as the unit of analysis, our model helps explain intra- as well as inter-organizational response heterogeneity to institutional complexity. We contribute to the institutional research tradition and offer useful implications for managerial practice, from strategic management to policy making

Contacts  

Département Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Campus HEC Paris
1, rue de la Libération
78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex
France

Faculté  

Laurence LEHMANN ORTEGA

Stratégie et Politique d'Entreprise

Voir le CV

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