Séminaires de recherche

SIGNAL OR SYMBOL? INTERPRETING FIRM'S STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE BRAZILIAN STOCK MARKET

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : SUSAN PERKINS
PROFESSOR , KELLOG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

26 novembre 2013 - SALLE DU CONSEIL - De 10h30 à 12h00


While analyzing how and why firms respond to product market demands has been a long withstanding central issue in the strategy literature, recent research suggests the need for a comparable level of attention on how and why firms respond to non-market (i.e., institutional) demands. In this study, we theoretically and empirically analyze how Brazilian listed firms responded to voluntary institutional reforms (aimed at reducing longstanding agency problems related to pyramidal group ownership) to the BOVESPA stock market to better understand strategic response to institutional changes. This study provides insight on which types of firms are more likely to adopt new institutional practices; how firm market signals affect firm stock performance; and whether implementing new organizational practices, or not, affects the longevity of changes in performance. We show that firms that signaled to the market better governance practices received abnormal stock returns at the time of announcement and migration. However, we also find that in many cases, the changes observed are more symbolic than substantive. In cases where the main shareholder is a family-owned pyramidal group, the firm is more likely to decouple. Conversely, government-owned and dual-listed firms are less likely to be non-implementers of the new corporate governance practices.

Tough on criminal wealth? Exploring the link between organized crime asset confiscation and regional entrepreneurship

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Elisa OPERTI
ESSEC

19 octobre 2017 - HEC Salle T017 - De 13h30 à 15h00


This paper joins a recent stream of research delving into the market and societal implications of initiatives against organized crime. We ask the question “How does the fight against organized crime affect entrepreneurial entries in a region?” We focus on asset confiscation in relation to alleged connections of their owners with organized crime, one of the most debated judiciary tools to fight the interests of organized crime activities in a region. Consistent with research in institutional economics, we propose that criminal organizations provide “third-best” institutional frameworks that can limit expropriation and favor dispute resolution. Confiscation weakens criminal organizations’ ability to provide governance, creating an institutional vacuum that can lower founding rates, unless it is paired with complementary measures that favor institutional replacement. Using data on asset confiscation in Italian provinces between 2009 and 2013, we show that confiscation events increase entry rates only when local institutions can guarantee the redeployment of confiscated assets in legitimate markets.

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Sendhil Ethiraj
LBS

8 juin 2017


Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Tanya Menon
Ohio State University

6 juin 2017 - T004 - De 13h30 à 15h00


Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Karin Hoisl
University of Mannheim

11 mai 2017 - T015 - De 13h30 à 15h00


Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Thomas Mellewigt
Freie Universität Berlin

4 mai 2017


Contacts  

Département Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Campus HEC Paris
1, rue de la Libération
78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex
France

Faculté  

Bertrand MOINGEON

Stratégie et Politique d'Entreprise (GREGHEC)

Voir le CV

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