Séminaires de recherche

A Tree Induction Analysis of Exclusivity in Technology Licensing

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Deepak Somaya
Professeur Associé , University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

22 septembre 2016 - Salle Bernard Ramanantsoa - De 11h00 à 12h30


While prior research has significantly advanced our understanding about exclusivity in licensing, there are still significant gaps in our knowledge about how licensing exclusivity is impacted by the interplay between different contextual and intrinsic attributes of the license. Exclusivity in licensing can be highly complex and contingent, potentially reflecting the interactions between different theoretical explanations, and the boundary conditions that apply to each theory. The exploration of such contingencies and complexities is hampered in conventional econometric analyses, which we seek to overcome by employing a novel empirical technique called decision tree induction, a powerful machine learning tool for uncovering nested “multiple theoretical viewpoints.” Implications for the empirical and theoretical literature on licensing, and for abductive theory development by leveraging “big data” are discussed.

Tough on criminal wealth? Exploring the link between organized crime asset confiscation and regional entrepreneurship

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Elisa OPERTI

19 octobre 2017 - HEC Salle T017 - De 13h30 à 15h00

This paper joins a recent stream of research delving into the market and societal implications of initiatives against organized crime. We ask the question “How does the fight against organized crime affect entrepreneurial entries in a region?” We focus on asset confiscation in relation to alleged connections of their owners with organized crime, one of the most debated judiciary tools to fight the interests of organized crime activities in a region. Consistent with research in institutional economics, we propose that criminal organizations provide “third-best” institutional frameworks that can limit expropriation and favor dispute resolution. Confiscation weakens criminal organizations’ ability to provide governance, creating an institutional vacuum that can lower founding rates, unless it is paired with complementary measures that favor institutional replacement. Using data on asset confiscation in Italian provinces between 2009 and 2013, we show that confiscation events increase entry rates only when local institutions can guarantee the redeployment of confiscated assets in legitimate markets.

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Sendhil Ethiraj

8 juin 2017

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Tanya Menon
Ohio State University

6 juin 2017 - T004 - De 13h30 à 15h00

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Karin Hoisl
University of Mannheim

11 mai 2017 - T015 - De 13h30 à 15h00

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Thomas Mellewigt
Freie Universität Berlin

4 mai 2017


Département Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Campus HEC Paris
1, rue de la Libération
78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex



Stratégie et Politique d'Entreprise (GREGHEC)

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