Séminaires de recherche

WHEN BEING IN THE MINORITY PAYS OFF: RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SELLERS AND PRICE SETTING IN THE CHAMPAGNE INDUSTRY

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Isabel Fernandez-Matteo
LBS

7 avril 2016 - Salle du Conseil/B.Ramanantsoa - De 13h30 à 15h00

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Economic sociologists have studied how social relationships shape market prices by focusing mostly on vertical interactions between buyers and sellers. In this paper, we examine instead the price consequences of horizontal relationships that arise from intergroup processes among sellers. Our setting is the market for Champagne grapes. Using proprietary transaction-level data, we find that female grape growers—a minority in the growers’ community—charge systematically higher prices than do male grape growers. We argue that the underlying mechanism for this unexpected pattern of results involves the relationships developed and maintained by minority members. More specifically, in-depth fieldwork reveals that female growers get together to compensate for their isolation from the majority. This behavior enables them to overcome local constraints on the availability of price-relevant information, constraints that stem from prevailing norms of market behavior: individualism and secrecy. We discuss the implications of these findings for the study of how relationships shape price-setting processes, for the sociological literature on intergroup relations, and for our understanding of inequality in markets.

Tough on criminal wealth? Exploring the link between organized crime asset confiscation and regional entrepreneurship

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Elisa OPERTI
ESSEC

19 octobre 2017 - HEC Salle T017 - De 13h30 à 15h00


This paper joins a recent stream of research delving into the market and societal implications of initiatives against organized crime. We ask the question “How does the fight against organized crime affect entrepreneurial entries in a region?” We focus on asset confiscation in relation to alleged connections of their owners with organized crime, one of the most debated judiciary tools to fight the interests of organized crime activities in a region. Consistent with research in institutional economics, we propose that criminal organizations provide “third-best” institutional frameworks that can limit expropriation and favor dispute resolution. Confiscation weakens criminal organizations’ ability to provide governance, creating an institutional vacuum that can lower founding rates, unless it is paired with complementary measures that favor institutional replacement. Using data on asset confiscation in Italian provinces between 2009 and 2013, we show that confiscation events increase entry rates only when local institutions can guarantee the redeployment of confiscated assets in legitimate markets.

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Sendhil Ethiraj
LBS

8 juin 2017


Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Tanya Menon
Ohio State University

6 juin 2017 - T004 - De 13h30 à 15h00


Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Karin Hoisl
University of Mannheim

11 mai 2017 - T015 - De 13h30 à 15h00


Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Thomas Mellewigt
Freie Universität Berlin

4 mai 2017


Contacts  

Département Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Campus HEC Paris
1, rue de la Libération
78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex
France

Faculté  

Denisa MINDRUTA

Stratégie et Politique d'Entreprise (GREGHEC)

Voir le CV

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