Séminaires de recherche

Government Free Riding in Medical Research

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Margaret Kyle
MINES ParisTech

12 mai 2016 - Salle du Conseil/B.Ramanantsoa - De 13h30 à 15h00

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Because knowledge spillovers cause the private sector to underinvest in research,
governments often fund research, especially medical research. However, knowledge
spillovers across borders might introduce free-riding by governments on each other.
We provide the rst empirical evidence of how a government responds to medical
research funding by another government. Using data from 2007 to 2014 on infectious
and parasitic diseases, we examine how governments and foundations in 41 countries
changed their funding in response to outlays by the US government, which accounted
for about half of public outlays in our sample. Because funding decisions by the US
and by other countries might have common unobserved drivers, we instrument for US
spending using the political composition of the US Congress. Congress sets the budget
for the US National Institutes of Health, and thus a ects US research funding, but does
not directly a ect other countries' research funding. We nd that a 10% US funding
increase for a disease is associated with a 1% funding reduction for that disease by an
individual foundation or government agency and a 4% reduction for other governments
in aggregate.

Tough on criminal wealth? Exploring the link between organized crime asset confiscation and regional entrepreneurship

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Elisa OPERTI
ESSEC

19 octobre 2017 - HEC Salle T017 - De 13h30 à 15h00


This paper joins a recent stream of research delving into the market and societal implications of initiatives against organized crime. We ask the question “How does the fight against organized crime affect entrepreneurial entries in a region?” We focus on asset confiscation in relation to alleged connections of their owners with organized crime, one of the most debated judiciary tools to fight the interests of organized crime activities in a region. Consistent with research in institutional economics, we propose that criminal organizations provide “third-best” institutional frameworks that can limit expropriation and favor dispute resolution. Confiscation weakens criminal organizations’ ability to provide governance, creating an institutional vacuum that can lower founding rates, unless it is paired with complementary measures that favor institutional replacement. Using data on asset confiscation in Italian provinces between 2009 and 2013, we show that confiscation events increase entry rates only when local institutions can guarantee the redeployment of confiscated assets in legitimate markets.

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Sendhil Ethiraj
LBS

8 juin 2017


Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Tanya Menon
Ohio State University

6 juin 2017 - T004 - De 13h30 à 15h00


Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Karin Hoisl
University of Mannheim

11 mai 2017 - T015 - De 13h30 à 15h00


Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Thomas Mellewigt
Freie Universität Berlin

4 mai 2017


Contacts  

Département Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Campus HEC Paris
1, rue de la Libération
78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex
France

Faculté  

Pierre DUSSAUGE

Stratégie et Politique d'Entreprise (GREGHEC)

Voir le CV

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