Séminaires de recherche

Craving the Big Deal? Activity load, TMT Turnover and Strategic Momentum in Acquisition Behavior

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Tomi Lamaamen
University of St. Gallen

9 juin 2016 - E lab - De 13h30 à 15h00


Despite their prominence, strategic momentum based explanations of acquisition behavior are characterized by two
important shortcomings. First, momentum theorizing has disregarded the temporal dynamics through which acquisition
activity occurs. Second, strategic momentum based explanations do not account for the fact that different actors in an
organization possess the routines and cognitive frameworks developed based on acquisition experience. In this paper,
we extend momentum theory by accounting for the temporal dynamics of the accumulation of experience and the locus
of the formation of routines and cognitive frameworks in organizations. We examine different types of activity loads
arising from small and large acquisition activity and their effects on strategic momentum. Based on our empirical
analysis, we find that increases in either small or large acquisition activity tend to lead to activity load which curtails the
size-related acquisition momentum rather than sustaining it contrary to what the momentum theory would predict. In
addition, we identify an interesting switching dynamic. We find that an increase in small acquisition activity is positively
related to a switch to large acquisitions and an increase in large acquisition activity is positively related to a switch to
small acquisitions. Finally, we find that TMT turnover reduces the likelihood of all kinds of acquisitions suggesting that
TMT turnover affects the shared cognitive frameworks underlying momentum behavior.

Tough on criminal wealth? Exploring the link between organized crime asset confiscation and regional entrepreneurship

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Elisa OPERTI

19 octobre 2017 - HEC Salle T017 - De 13h30 à 15h00

This paper joins a recent stream of research delving into the market and societal implications of initiatives against organized crime. We ask the question “How does the fight against organized crime affect entrepreneurial entries in a region?” We focus on asset confiscation in relation to alleged connections of their owners with organized crime, one of the most debated judiciary tools to fight the interests of organized crime activities in a region. Consistent with research in institutional economics, we propose that criminal organizations provide “third-best” institutional frameworks that can limit expropriation and favor dispute resolution. Confiscation weakens criminal organizations’ ability to provide governance, creating an institutional vacuum that can lower founding rates, unless it is paired with complementary measures that favor institutional replacement. Using data on asset confiscation in Italian provinces between 2009 and 2013, we show that confiscation events increase entry rates only when local institutions can guarantee the redeployment of confiscated assets in legitimate markets.

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Sendhil Ethiraj

8 juin 2017

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Tanya Menon
Ohio State University

6 juin 2017 - T004 - De 13h30 à 15h00

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Karin Hoisl
University of Mannheim

11 mai 2017 - T015 - De 13h30 à 15h00

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Thomas Mellewigt
Freie Universität Berlin

4 mai 2017