Séminaires de recherche

Responding to the Threat of Reputation Loss: Inaccurate Self-Reporting in the Nursing Home Industry

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Amandine Ody-Brasier
Yale

9 février 2017 - T036 - De 12h00 à 13h30

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Because third-party evaluation systems, such as ratings and rankings, increasingly serve as a basis for firms’ reputations, organizations pay a great deal of attention to ensuring that they perform well according to such evaluation systems. However, while such systems are intended to incentivize firms to improve in a variety of substantive areas, firms may instead opt to bolster their standing by engaging in various forms of “gaming the system.” In cases where third-party evaluators rely on the organizations being assessed to self-report the data that form the basis for their rating/ranking, “gaming” may include providing false or misleading information. Relatively little work has investigated the conditions under which this is likely to occur. In this paper, we theorize factors that cause rated firms to vary in the reputational incentives they face, leading to differences in the likelihood of reporting false or misleading data. We test our predictions in the context of the U.S. nursing home industry, finding that not-for-profit firms, those with better previous reputations and those facing greater localized competition are more likely to report misleading data. We discuss implications for both consumers and designers of ratings.

Tough on criminal wealth? Exploring the link between organized crime asset confiscation and regional entrepreneurship

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Elisa OPERTI
ESSEC

19 octobre 2017 - HEC Salle T017 - De 13h30 à 15h00


This paper joins a recent stream of research delving into the market and societal implications of initiatives against organized crime. We ask the question “How does the fight against organized crime affect entrepreneurial entries in a region?” We focus on asset confiscation in relation to alleged connections of their owners with organized crime, one of the most debated judiciary tools to fight the interests of organized crime activities in a region. Consistent with research in institutional economics, we propose that criminal organizations provide “third-best” institutional frameworks that can limit expropriation and favor dispute resolution. Confiscation weakens criminal organizations’ ability to provide governance, creating an institutional vacuum that can lower founding rates, unless it is paired with complementary measures that favor institutional replacement. Using data on asset confiscation in Italian provinces between 2009 and 2013, we show that confiscation events increase entry rates only when local institutions can guarantee the redeployment of confiscated assets in legitimate markets.

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Sendhil Ethiraj
LBS

8 juin 2017


Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Tanya Menon
Ohio State University

6 juin 2017 - T004 - De 13h30 à 15h00


Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Karin Hoisl
University of Mannheim

11 mai 2017 - T015 - De 13h30 à 15h00


Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Thomas Mellewigt
Freie Universität Berlin

4 mai 2017



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