Séminaires de recherche


Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Matthew Bidwell

2 février 2017 - T025 - De 13h30 à 15h00


This paper proposes a novel, ladder-based perspective to explain the patterns and causes of inter-organizational mobility. We argue that lower-level and higher-level jobs are often unevenly distributed across organizations, such that workers must often move organizations in order to climb the job ladder towards increased status and rewards. Unlike the dominant models that imply a relatively haphazard pattern of job mobility, our ladder-based perspective characterizes a systematic pattern of labor market flows, with workers beginning careers in “upstream” organizations but moving on to “downstream” organizations once they have acquired experience. Using matched employer-employee data on Swedish workers, our results support this directionality hypothesis, showing that organizations differ systematically in whether they hire workers with more versus less experience. Moreover, our results demonstrate that worker mobility arises from the interaction between organizations’ positioning within the labor market flows and workers’ career stages. In particular, mobility rates among experienced workers are greater out of upstream organizations than they are out of downstream organizations. Based on these results, we discuss theoretical implications for research on career mobility, organizations, and labor markets

Tough on criminal wealth? Exploring the link between organized crime asset confiscation and regional entrepreneurship

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Elisa OPERTI

19 octobre 2017 - HEC Salle T017 - De 13h30 à 15h00

This paper joins a recent stream of research delving into the market and societal implications of initiatives against organized crime. We ask the question “How does the fight against organized crime affect entrepreneurial entries in a region?” We focus on asset confiscation in relation to alleged connections of their owners with organized crime, one of the most debated judiciary tools to fight the interests of organized crime activities in a region. Consistent with research in institutional economics, we propose that criminal organizations provide “third-best” institutional frameworks that can limit expropriation and favor dispute resolution. Confiscation weakens criminal organizations’ ability to provide governance, creating an institutional vacuum that can lower founding rates, unless it is paired with complementary measures that favor institutional replacement. Using data on asset confiscation in Italian provinces between 2009 and 2013, we show that confiscation events increase entry rates only when local institutions can guarantee the redeployment of confiscated assets in legitimate markets.

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Sendhil Ethiraj

8 juin 2017

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Tanya Menon
Ohio State University

6 juin 2017 - T004 - De 13h30 à 15h00

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Karin Hoisl
University of Mannheim

11 mai 2017 - T015 - De 13h30 à 15h00

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Thomas Mellewigt
Freie Universität Berlin

4 mai 2017


Département Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Campus HEC Paris
1, rue de la Libération
78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex



Stratégie et Politique d'Entreprise (GREGHEC)

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