Séminaires de recherche

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Karin Hoisl
University of Mannheim

11 mai 2017 - T015 - De 13h30 à 15h00

Make-and-Ally and Performance: Evidence from the Korean TV Drama Industry

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Evan Rawley
Associate Professor of Strategic Management & Entrepreneurship , Carlson School of Business- University of Minnesota

14 juin 2018 - Room #S218 - De 14h00 à 15h30

Make-and-ally governance, where integrated firms develop new products internally while simultaneously collaborating on new product development with suppliers, is becoming increasingly common in knowledge-based industries. Yet, there is little theory or evidence to explain the prevalence of this governance mode. In this paper, we propose that, when downstream commercialization is concentrated relative to upstream product development, make-and-ally governance improves market performance of knowledge-based products and facilitates value capture for the integrated firm. Using data from the Korean TV drama industry, we find qualitative and quantitative evidence that collaborative development between network companies and independent production companies improves viewership ratings of TV dramas. The results suggest that make-and-ally governance is driven partly by efficiency and partly by market power considerations.

Rationalizing Outcomes: Mental-Model-Guided Learning in Competitive Markets

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Anoop Menon
Assistant Professor of Management , The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

31 mai 2018 - Room #T105 - De 13h30 à 15h00

This paper explores how competitive market interactions between agents with different mental models can lead to dysfunctional learning which can, in turn, have significant implications for an agent’s performance. We build a simulation model where two agents with different mental models about their demand environment compete over many periods, with the decisions of one period leading to market outcomes that are then used to recalibrate the mental models which, in turn, are used to make the decisions in the following period. Three model variants, exploring different mental models about the demand structure, the cost structure, and the market are studied. Dysfunctional learning occurs through dynamic mechanisms involving rationalization of observations within flexible mental models and misinterpretation of observations because of poor understanding of rival mental models. These mechanisms sometimes lead to distortion of an agent’s own initially correct mental model of the demand environment and to superior relative performance by the agent with an incorrect model of that environment. The insights from the models are used to interpret the ascension of GM over Ford in the late 1920’s, the slow adoption of radial tires in the U.S., and the rise of Nirma over incumbent Hindustan Lever in the Indian detergent market.

Discrimination and Entrepreneurship: Evidence from LGBT Rights Laws

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Olenka Kacperczyk
Associate Professor of Strategy and Entrepreneurship , London Business School

3 mai 2018 - Room # T004 - De 13h30 à 15h00

This study revisits the well-established claim that reducing discrimination spurs entrepreneurial entry. We propose that the effect of antidiscrimination initiatives on entrepreneurship depends crucially on whether discrimination originates on the demand- or the supply-side of the entrepreneurial process. The benefits of antidiscrimination practices in the context of entry are based on the study of the demand-side discrimination, or bias which arises when prospective entrepreneurs face discrimination by key resource providers for a new venture (i.e., investors, banks, prospective employers). We hypothesize the opposite effect on the supply-side, or when prospective entrepreneurs face discrimination in paid employment. Using evidence from the enactment of LGBT antidiscrimination policies, we show that initiatives to reduce employer discrimination deter entry into entrepreneurship because they increase the appeal of paid employment relative to entrepreneurship. Despite the reduction in the rates of entrepreneurship, however, new ventures’ growth orientation increases because antidiscrimination policies motivate the pursuit of higher-potential opportunities.

Competition within and across market positions: Strategic Responses to Entry Threats

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Yue Maggie Zhou
Assistant Professor of Strategy , University of Michigan

5 mars 2018 - Room # T004 - De 13h30 à 15h00

This paper unites the literature on market positions and competitive interactions to examine incumbent responses to the entry threat of a low-cost firm. We adapt a theoretical model of capacity expansion to show that the cost of the incumbent’s competitive response and the entrant’s cost of entry influence the incumbent’s response. We argue that both these costs vary with the prior choices (i.e., market positions) of incumbents and entrants. Using data on incumbent responses to entry threats from Southwest Airlines between 2003 and 2012, we find that: (1) full-service carriers expanded capacity while low-cost carriers avoided competition, and (2) full-service carriers expanded capacity less aggressively in markets that had less substitutive customer segments.

Tough on criminal wealth? Exploring the link between organized crime asset confiscation and regional entrepreneurship

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Elisa OPERTI

19 octobre 2017 - HEC Salle T017 - De 13h30 à 15h00

This paper joins a recent stream of research delving into the market and societal implications of initiatives against organized crime. We ask the question “How does the fight against organized crime affect entrepreneurial entries in a region?” We focus on asset confiscation in relation to alleged connections of their owners with organized crime, one of the most debated judiciary tools to fight the interests of organized crime activities in a region. Consistent with research in institutional economics, we propose that criminal organizations provide “third-best” institutional frameworks that can limit expropriation and favor dispute resolution. Confiscation weakens criminal organizations’ ability to provide governance, creating an institutional vacuum that can lower founding rates, unless it is paired with complementary measures that favor institutional replacement. Using data on asset confiscation in Italian provinces between 2009 and 2013, we show that confiscation events increase entry rates only when local institutions can guarantee the redeployment of confiscated assets in legitimate markets.


Département Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Campus HEC Paris
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Stratégie et Politique d'Entreprise

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