Séminaires de recherche

Government Free Riding in Medical Research

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Margaret Kyle
MINES ParisTech

12 mai 2016 - Salle du Conseil/B.Ramanantsoa - De 13h30 à 15h00

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Because knowledge spillovers cause the private sector to underinvest in research,
governments often fund research, especially medical research. However, knowledge
spillovers across borders might introduce free-riding by governments on each other.
We provide the rst empirical evidence of how a government responds to medical
research funding by another government. Using data from 2007 to 2014 on infectious
and parasitic diseases, we examine how governments and foundations in 41 countries
changed their funding in response to outlays by the US government, which accounted
for about half of public outlays in our sample. Because funding decisions by the US
and by other countries might have common unobserved drivers, we instrument for US
spending using the political composition of the US Congress. Congress sets the budget
for the US National Institutes of Health, and thus a ects US research funding, but does
not directly a ect other countries' research funding. We nd that a 10% US funding
increase for a disease is associated with a 1% funding reduction for that disease by an
individual foundation or government agency and a 4% reduction for other governments
in aggregate.

Competition and Influence between Critics

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : David Waguespack
University of Maryland

14 avril 2016 - De 12h00 à 14h00


WHEN BEING IN THE MINORITY PAYS OFF: RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SELLERS AND PRICE SETTING IN THE CHAMPAGNE INDUSTRY

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Isabel Fernandez-Matteo
LBS

7 avril 2016 - Salle du Conseil/B.Ramanantsoa - De 13h30 à 15h00

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Economic sociologists have studied how social relationships shape market prices by focusing mostly on vertical interactions between buyers and sellers. In this paper, we examine instead the price consequences of horizontal relationships that arise from intergroup processes among sellers. Our setting is the market for Champagne grapes. Using proprietary transaction-level data, we find that female grape growers—a minority in the growers’ community—charge systematically higher prices than do male grape growers. We argue that the underlying mechanism for this unexpected pattern of results involves the relationships developed and maintained by minority members. More specifically, in-depth fieldwork reveals that female growers get together to compensate for their isolation from the majority. This behavior enables them to overcome local constraints on the availability of price-relevant information, constraints that stem from prevailing norms of market behavior: individualism and secrecy. We discuss the implications of these findings for the study of how relationships shape price-setting processes, for the sociological literature on intergroup relations, and for our understanding of inequality in markets.

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Mikolaj PISKORSKI
Professor , Harvard Business School

10 avril 2014 - Salle du Conseil


Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Serguey BRAGUINSKY
Professor , Carnegie Mellon University

20 mars 2014 - Salle du Conseil - De 13h00 à 14h30


Contacts  

Département Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Campus HEC Paris
1, rue de la Libération
78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex
France

Faculté  

Cyrille CHEVRILLON

Stratégie et Politique d'Entreprise

Voir le CV

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