Séminaires de recherche

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Stefano Brusoni
ETH Zürich

27 avril 2017 - T015 - De 13h30 à 15h00


Co-Constructing Plural Leadership Dynamics Among Professional Peers

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Laura Empson
Cass Business School

23 mars 2017 - T020 - De 10h30 à 12h00


Responding to the Threat of Reputation Loss: Inaccurate Self-Reporting in the Nursing Home Industry

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Amandine Ody-Brasier
Yale

9 février 2017 - T036 - De 12h00 à 13h30

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Because third-party evaluation systems, such as ratings and rankings, increasingly serve as a basis for firms’ reputations, organizations pay a great deal of attention to ensuring that they perform well according to such evaluation systems. However, while such systems are intended to incentivize firms to improve in a variety of substantive areas, firms may instead opt to bolster their standing by engaging in various forms of “gaming the system.” In cases where third-party evaluators rely on the organizations being assessed to self-report the data that form the basis for their rating/ranking, “gaming” may include providing false or misleading information. Relatively little work has investigated the conditions under which this is likely to occur. In this paper, we theorize factors that cause rated firms to vary in the reputational incentives they face, leading to differences in the likelihood of reporting false or misleading data. We test our predictions in the context of the U.S. nursing home industry, finding that not-for-profit firms, those with better previous reputations and those facing greater localized competition are more likely to report misleading data. We discuss implications for both consumers and designers of ratings.

GOING WITH THE FLOW: A LADDER-BASED PERSPECTIVE ON INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL MOBILITY

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Matthew Bidwell
Wharton

2 février 2017 - T025 - De 13h30 à 15h00

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This paper proposes a novel, ladder-based perspective to explain the patterns and causes of inter-organizational mobility. We argue that lower-level and higher-level jobs are often unevenly distributed across organizations, such that workers must often move organizations in order to climb the job ladder towards increased status and rewards. Unlike the dominant models that imply a relatively haphazard pattern of job mobility, our ladder-based perspective characterizes a systematic pattern of labor market flows, with workers beginning careers in “upstream” organizations but moving on to “downstream” organizations once they have acquired experience. Using matched employer-employee data on Swedish workers, our results support this directionality hypothesis, showing that organizations differ systematically in whether they hire workers with more versus less experience. Moreover, our results demonstrate that worker mobility arises from the interaction between organizations’ positioning within the labor market flows and workers’ career stages. In particular, mobility rates among experienced workers are greater out of upstream organizations than they are out of downstream organizations. Based on these results, we discuss theoretical implications for research on career mobility, organizations, and labor markets

Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Intervenant : Michaël Bikard
LBS

8 décembre 2016 - Salle du Conseil/B.Ramanantsoa - De 10h00 à 11h30


Contacts  

Département Stratégie et Politique d’Entreprise

Campus HEC Paris
1, rue de la Libération
78351 Jouy-en-Josas cedex
France

Faculté  

John Kenneth MAWDSLEY

Stratégie et Politique d'Entreprise (GREGHEC)

Voir le CV

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